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Abstract—Application-level firewalls filter traffic based on a
white list of processes that are allowed to access the network.
Although they have a complete overview of the system in which
they are executed, they can be easily bypassed by knowledgable
attackers. In this paper we present AL-SAFE, a cloud-tailored
application-level self-adaptable firewall which combines the high
degree of visibility of an application-level firewall with the
isolation of a traditional standalone firewall. AL-SAFE is able
to filter traffic at two distinct points in the virtual infrastructure
and adapt the enforced rulesets based on changes in the virtual
infrastructure topology and the list of services running inside the
virtual machines. Our performance analysis shows that AL-SAFE
imposes a tolerable delay to legitimate network connections while
it is able to filter out all unauthorised packets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Key IaaS clouds features include multi-tenancy, elasticity
and on-demand availability. This allows tenants to manage re-
sources dynamically and create, destroy or reconfigure virtual
machines automatically. However, the same features also affect
the ability of a security monitoring framework to successfully
detect attacks in outsourced information systems [1] and
sometimes introduce new security vulnerabilities.
Large-scale security frameworks include several compo-
nents (firewalls, intrusion detection systems, log collectors
etc.) that are located in different areas or even outside the
virtual infrastructure. Consequently, changes in the number of
virtual machines (VMs) (e.g. addition of new instances) or
in their placement (e.g. live migration) require the security
monitoring system to be adapted. To be able to cope with the
high frequency of such changes, a security monitoring frame-
work should be able to adapt its components automatically. To
this end, we introduced SAIDS [2], a self-adaptable security
monitoring framework, that can automatically adapt a network
IDS to virtual infrastructure changes.
In this paper, we focus on application-level firewalls, which
are another type of security device in IaaS clouds.
In contrast to typical host- or network-level firewalls which
filter network traffic based on a list of rules that use IP ad-
dresses and ports, application-level firewalls operate based on a
white list of processes that are allowed to access the network.
This fine-grained filtering is achievable because application-
level firewalls run inside the host operating system, and thus
have a complete overview of the running applications.
Unfortunately, in the conventional design of application-
level firewalls, isolation between the firewall and vulnerable
applications is provided by their OS kernel, whose large attack
surface makes attacks disabling the firewall probable. Hence,
we address the following challenge: Can we keep the same
level of visibility while limiting the attack surface between
infected applications and a trusted, application-level firewall?
To address this challenge we designed and implemented
AL-SAFE, a two-level application-level firewall that operates
outside of the virtual machine it is monitoring, in a completely
separate domain. By leveraging virtual machine introspection
we retain the same level of ”inside-the-host” visibility while
introducing a high-confidence barrier between the firewall and
the attacker’s malicious code. AL-SAFE is able to reconfigure
the enforced ruleset based on changes in the virtual infrastruc-
ture topology (virtual machine migration, creation, deletion)
and in the list of services running inside the deployed VMs.
AL-SAFE consists of two components operating at distinct
infrastructure locations: an edge firewall, that filters network
traffic between the outside world and the cloud infrastructure,
and a local switch-level firewall, that filters traffic in the
local switch of each physical host. Both components, executed
outside the untrusted virtual machine, become application-
level firewalls by using virtual machine introspection.
Our contributions include the design of the self-adaptable
introspection-based application-level firewall and a compre-
hensive performance and correctness evaluation of our design.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section II
presents related work. Section III outlines the main objectives
of AL-SAFE and describes its architecture. Section IV presents
our prototype implementation while Section V describes a
thorough performance and security evaluation of AL-SAFE.
Finally, Section VI concludes the paper with future work.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section we discuss cloud-tailored firewalls and
security applications that leverage the isolation properties
offered by virtual machine introspection. Virtual machine
introspection is a mechanism that allows, through memory
mapping, indirect inspection of and control over the current
state of a virtual machine from software running outside of
the virtual machine. The approach is based on building higher-
level semantics (data structures, files) that can be accessed by
a monitoring application from the mapped memory pages.
Virtual machine introspection was introduced first by
Garfinkel and Rosenblum in [3], and has been used to
implement secure host-based IDSes like Livewire [3] and
IntroVirt [4]. The main idea is to locate the IDS in the
hypervisor, and to let it monitor the operating system and
applications of a VM using introspection. These IDSes do
passive network monitoring of the VMs but do not however,
address dynamic changes in the virtual infrastructure. AL-
SAFE is able to handle dynamic infrastructure changes and
automatically adapt the enforced ruleset.
Amazon EC2 provides IaaS cloud tenants with firewalls,
named security groups [5], that are located outside the virtual
machines and offer protection from attacks originating outside
the cloud infrastructure by filtering inbound traffic only. The
security groups are oblivious to the type and nature of the
tenant applications thus making fine-grained application-based
network traffic filtering impossible. Furthermore it is unclear
whether the cloud provider adds rules to the security groups.
Web Application Firewall [6] is another Amazon product
offering rule-based protection against specific types of attacks
(i.e SQL injection) and traffic filtering based on access control
lists. AL-SAFE offers a better service regarding traffic filtering
rules, because ports are only open when the application is
running, and filtering is not limited to Web applications.
In xFilter [7] virtual machine introspection is used to create
a self-protection mechanism against stepping-stone-attacks [8].
The outgoing packets are filtered in the hypervisor. xFilter
cannot handle dynamic infrastructure changes (such as VM
migration) and only filters outgoing traffic. AL-SAFE filters
both incoming and outgoing connections and handles dynamic
infrastructure changes by reconfiguring the filtering rules.
Our goal is to design a self-adaptable introspection-based
application-level firewall that can filter inbound and outgoing
traffic based on a white list of applications that are allowed
to access the network. We leverage VM introspection for
retaining the high degree of visibility of an application-level
firewall while making it tamper-resistant to any user- or kernel-
level malware located in the monitored VM.
III. DESIGN OF AL-SAFE
We propose a two-level introspection-based application-
level firewall with a self-adaptable ruleset. The reconfiguration
of the enforced ruleset depends upon changes in two different
layers: service layer (addition or removal of services) and
virtual infrastructure layer (e.g. VM creation, deletion or
migration). In this section we outline AL-SAFE objectives
together with our threat model and a detailed description of
AL-SAFE architecture.
A. AL-SAFE Objectives
AL-SAFE should satisfy the following properties:
• Self-adaptation: the enforced ruleset should be con-
figured with respect to dynamic changes that occur in
a cloud environment, especially virtual infrastructure
changes like VM creation, deletion and migration.
• Service-based customisation: the ruleset on both firewall
levels should be configurable to only allow network traffic
that originates from and to the tenant-approved services.
• Tamper-resistance: AL-SAFE should continue to op-
erate reliably even if an attacker gains control of a
monitored VM. In particular, the reconfiguration of the
enforced ruleset should not rely on information originat-
ing from components installed inside the monitored guest.
• Cost minimisation: the overall cost in terms of resource
consumption must be kept at a minimal level both for
the tenants and the provider. This is achieved by sharing
AL-SAFE’s components between tenants.
B. Models
We briefly describe the system model of the cloud infras-
tructure and the threat model considered for AL-SAFE.
1) System model: We consider an IaaS cloud with a cloud
controller that has a global view of the system. An Adaptation
Manager [2] is located inside the cloud controller and is
responsible for reconfiguring the installed security probes in
the event of a change in the virtual infrastructure topology
(VM migration, creation, deletion) or an update in the list of
potentially running services (addition or removal). Customers
pay for resources that are part of a multi-tenant environment
based on a Service Level Agreement (SLA). Each customer
is in control of an interconnected group of VMs that hosts
tenant-selected services.
2) Threat model: We consider software attacks only, that
originate both from malicious VMs as well as from outside the
cloud infrastructure. Attackers can install malicious software
on a victim VM by exploiting a software vulnerability in an
application or the operating system. The exploit can execute
both at user or kernel levels. The installed malware can get
full control of the VM and use the network. However we
consider that the provider infrastructure is secure. Malicious
code cannot be injected at any part of the hypervisor or AL-
SAFE’s components.
C. Two-level Firewall Architecture
AL-SAFE is a secure, introspection-based, two-level,
application-level firewall. It extends the SAIDS [2] self-
adaptable security monitoring framework for IaaS clouds with
a new type of security device. AL-SAFE rulesets are automati-
cally reconfigured upon changes at two levels: the cloud infras-
tructure and the list of services running inside the monitored
VM. AL-SAFE consists of five main components depicted in
Figure 1: the Introspection component (VMI), the Information
Extraction Agent (IEA), the Rule Generators (RG), the edge
firewall (EF), that filters network traffic between the outside
world and the cloud infrastructure, and a local switch-level
firewall (SLF), that filters traffic in the local switch of each
physical host. All components are run by the provider.
The introspection-based self-adaptation process is executed
periodically as follows: first, the VMI introspects the mem-
ory of the monitored guest to obtain the list of processes
attempting to access the network. Second, the IEA extracts
the information for generating filtering rules and propagates it
to the two Rule Generators. Finally the RGs create the switch-
level and edge firewall rules and inject them in the firewalls.
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Figure 1. Flow of adaptation in AL-SAFE
The IEA takes as a parameter a tenant-defined white list of
processes that are allowed to access the network.
The Introspection component is able to coherently access
the VM’s physical memory and uses a profile of the VM’s
operating system’s kernel to interpret its data structures. Thus
VMI first extracts the list of running processes, and then
iterates over this list to check if a network socket figures
in the per-process list of file descriptors. For each network
socket found, VMI extracts the process name, the pid as well
as source and destination port, IP address and protocol.
The introspection period is defined by the tenant and can
be dynamically adapted by the Adaptation Manager [2].
The Information Extraction Agent compares the list of
processes that attempt to access the network (connection list
thereafter) with a tenant-defined white list of processes (white
list thereafter). The Adaptation Manager [2] is responsible for
sharing the white list with the Information Extraction Agent
through a secure channel. The IEA allows connections from
the connection list that figure in the white list, and blocks
all other connections. The IEA propagates the connection
information together with an ALLOW or BLOCK action to
the Rule Generators. Each RG creates the corresponding rule
using all propagated information such as source port, source IP
address, destination port, destination IP address and protocol.
The generated rules are then injected in the two firewalls.
The Switch-level firewall filters network packets in the local
switch using a list of ALLOW and BLOCK rules. At the
switch level, filtering blocks malicious traffic originating from
inside the cloud infrastructure at an early stage, thus reducing
the load of monitored traffic in the remaining security devices.
On a change in the virtual infrastructure topology (e.g. VM
migration) the Adaptation Manager stops the periodical intro-
spection process and oversees that the last valid information
set from the IEA along with the introspection period is sent to
the destination node. The destination’s RG creates the switch-
level rules and inserts them into the local switch.
The Edge firewall is located at the edge of the virtual
infrastructure in a separate network device. The location of
the EF ensures that external malicious traffic will be blocked
at an early stage while there will be no performance penalties
in the deployed VMs.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented a prototype of AL-SAFE using the KVM
hypervisor in a private cloud. We used OpenStack [9] as
the cloud management system and Open vSwitch [10] as a
multilayer virtual switch. A description of the implementation
for each component of AL-SAFE follows.
• For VMI we used the LibVMI [11] introspection frame-
work. In order to provide a coherent view of the VM’s
memory to the introspection process, we take a mem-
ory snapshot of the monitored guest before each intro-
spection. LibVMI uses KVM’s built-in memory access
mechanisms in order to snapshot the VM by copying the
whole memory of the introspected guest on a temporary
file. During the snapshot the VM is paused and cannot
make forward progress. To correlate running processes
and open sockets inside the monitored VM we deployed
the Volatility Memory Forensics [12] framework and used
its driver for the Ubuntu 13.10 Linux kernel. Volatility
can support any kernel version provided that a profile
with the kernel symbols and data structures is created.
The cloud provider would have to maintain a profile
for each OS version deployed on the monitored VMs.
A wrapper triggers introspection periodically and can
adapt the introspection period dynamically. This wrapper
is implemented in Python.
• To enable VMI on dynamic infrastructure changes (e.g
VM migration), notifier hooks were placed inside the
Nova function pluggin vifs() that is responsible for cre-
ating the virtual interface(s) for the VM. The hooks pass
all necessary information to VMI (VM name, id, version
of running OS, etc) and start it immediately after the VM
is resumed. All hooks are implemented in Python.
• For the switch-level firewall we use the stateless filtering
capabilities offered by Open vSwitch while for the edge
firewall we rely on the Nftables [13] stateful packet
filtering framework deployed in a standalone Linux host.
• Both the IEA and the RGs are implemented in Python.
The SLF RG produces OpenFlow filtering rules while the
EF RG produces Nftables-compatible rules. The created
rulesets are injected in parallel in the SLF and EF.
V. EVALUATION
In this section we present a detailed evaluation focusing
both on cost and correctness aspects of AL-SAFE. Since
cost minimisation is one of AL-SAFE core objectives we
evaluate the associated performance impact of deploying our
firewall architecture both from the provider’s and tenant’s
perspectives. Our experiments aim at identifying the overhead
induced on normal cloud operations (such as VM migration)
and also in tenant applications running inside untrusted VMs.
We evaluate our approach under different scenarios that in-
clude tenant applications that are either process- or network-
intensive. To identify the overhead of self-adapting the two-
level application-level firewall on individual connections we
utilise micro-benchmarks that calculate the setup time for TCP
and UDP connections. In addition to the performance overhead
of deploying AL-SAFE, both for tenants and the provider, we
also calculate the average resource consumption in terms of
RAM and CPU for the Introspection component of AL-SAFE.
Section V-A focuses on the overhead of AL-SAFE in virtual
machine migration while Section V-B focuses on the overhead
in tenant applications. Section V-C presents the results of the
micro-benchmarks while we show the resource consumption of
our framework in Section V-D. Finally Section V-E validates
the correctness of our approach.
To do our experiments we deployed a datacenter with three
physical hosts: one cloud controller and two compute nodes.
Each physical host has 48GB RAM and runs a 64bit Linux
Ubuntu 14.04 distribution. The machines are interconnected
with a 1Gb/s network. All the VMs deployed on the compute
nodes run a 64bit Linux Ubuntu 13.10 distribution with 2 cores
and 2GB RAM. We also deployed the Nftables firewall in a
separate physical host with the same hardware as our cloud
nodes. All reported results are compared to a baseline value
obtained without AL-SAFE.
Before running our experiments we conducted a preliminary
set of tests to calculate the time for a full snapshot of a 2GB
VM’s memory. We calculated the mean snapshot time value
to 1.5 seconds. Since the technique used copies the whole
memory of the VM into a dedicated file the size of the VM
is the only factor affecting the snapshot time.
A. Overhead in Normal Cloud Operations
To calculate the overhead of AL-SAFE in cloud operations
we calculate the time required to migrate a VM between two
nodes. We choose migration as the most representative cloud
operation as it addresses simultaneously the cases of VM
creation and deletion. In the case of a migration the running
introspection process is stopped and the last valid result is
sent to the destination node. Moreover, only the switch-level
firewalls (both at the source and the destination nodes) need
to be reconfigured. We calculate the migration time under two
different scenarios: an idle VM and a VM that runs a memory-
intensive workload. We aim at proving that the time required
to reconfigure the switch-level firewall is independent from the
VM workload. To generate the required workload we utilised
bw mem wr from the LMBench benchmark [14] suite with a
1024MB working set.
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The results are presented in Figure 2. The imposed overhead
in the migration operation is the same in both cases, which
validates our hypothesis that the cost of adapting the firewall
ruleset is independent from the VM workload.
A per-phase breakdown of the produced overhead is shown
in Figure 3. We insert two rules per service in the switch-level
firewall (one for ingress and one for egress traffic) and only
one rule in the edge firewall. The relatively high amount of
time (3.84 seconds) required for the Adaptation Manager to
notify the Introspection agent of the source node, in order to
interrupt the introspection and send the last valid results, is
mostly due to a defect in the DNS configuration resulting in
slow SSH connection establishment. This issue is fixed in the
last version of the prototype.
B. Overhead in Tenant Applications
To evaluate the performance overhead of our approach as
perceived by tenant applications running inside the untrusted
VM, we deployed three different scenarios with distinct appli-
cation profiles: for a process-intensive application we used a
parallel build of the Linux kernel while for a network-intensive
application we installed the Apache Web server [15] and
we used ApacheBench [16] to generate different workloads.
Finally to calculate the overhead of introspection on network
throughput we use Iperf [17]. The first scenario shows how
the introspection period affects the execution time of the
application whereas the second scenario shows the relation
between the arrival of the requests in the introspection cycle
and the server latency.
1) Linux Kernel: In this scenario we compiled a Linux
kernel inside the untrusted VM and we varied the introspection
period. The kernel was compiled with a configuration includ-
ing only the modules loaded by the running kernel of the VM,
using gcc 4.8.4 with a degree of parallelism of 3. The VM is
not expected to start services that use the network during the
execution time of the experiment thus no adaptation of the fire-
walls is required. The mean value over five repetitions is shown
in Figure 4. The results clearly demonstrate a dependency
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Figure 4. Impact of the introspection period on kernel compilation time
between the period of introspections and execution time. The
highest overhead (12%) is observed when the introspection
period is 60 seconds. This is because each introspection
requires a snapshot of the running VM which freezes the
VM for a short period of time. Evidently, more introspections
requires more freezing time for the VM, which requires longer
execution time.
2) Apache Web Server: In this scenario we examine two
aspects of our design: first the dependency between the intro-
spection period and the Web server throughput and second the
dependency between the arrival of the connection request in
the introspection cycle and the Web server latency. The second
aspect shows the impact of using periodic introspection on the
availability of a new Web server instance, like in a cloud scale-
up operation. For both aspects the client is located outside the
virtual infrastructure. For the first aspect no adaptation of the
firewalls is required (a preliminary phase to allow the connec-
tion between the server and the client is executed), while the
only varying parameter is the introspection period. We run the
experiment for 3 minutes and register the result. The workload
consists of 750,000 requests from 1000 concurrent clients.
The results shown in Figure 5 validate our previous obser-
vation regarding introspection period and performance degra-
dation. In this scenario, the highest number of introspections
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Figure 5. Impact of the introspection period on server throughput
(20 for the 15 seconds period) imposes the highest cost in the
server’s throughput (12%).
For the second aspect we fix the introspection period at
30 seconds and we start the Web server at port 80 between
two introspections. Thus an adaptation of both firewalls is
required in order to allow the connections from the client
to pass unimpeded. In this experiment we vary the time
of the connection request (right before introspection, in the
middle of introspection, at the end of introspection and after
introspection). The workload consists of 50,000 requests from
1000 concurrent clients. The results are shown on Figure 6.
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The highest value for the maximum response time (16,388
milliseconds) is observed when the client requests are issued
right before the introspection takes place. Indeed, in order to
establish the connection, the client application has to wait for
the introspection to be completed, the rules to be generated by
the two separate rule generators and then injected in the two
firewalls (two rules per service for the switch-level firewall
and one for the edge firewall). A per-phase breakdown of the
produced overhead is shown in Figure 7. When the requests are
issued at the end of introspection, we observe a maximum re-
sponse time of 14,082 ms. The produced overhead (compared
to a maximum rt of 13,520 ms without introspection) results
from the time required to reconfigure the two firewalls. The
time required to reconfigure the edge firewall is significantly
larger than the one for the switch-level firewall due to the
establishment of a secure connection between the node that
hosts the VM and the firewall node, as explained in V-A.
3) Iperf: In this scenario we install Iperf in the untrusted
VM which acts as a server and we utilise a separate host
outside the cloud infrastructure as a client. Iperf measures
the maximum available bandwidth on an IP network. Before
the experiment is executed we run a preliminary phase that
reconfigures both firewalls to allow the connection, such that
no adaptation is taking place during the experiment. We
execute the experiment for 300 seconds. The mean results over
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Figure 8. Impact of the introspection period on network throughput
five repetitions are shown in Figure 8. The results confirm
our previous observation regarding introspection period and
performance overhead. Indeed a shorter introspection period
results in more snapshots that evidently result to more down-
time for the VM. In this case the highest overhead (5.75%) is
observed in the 15 seconds case (20 snapshots).
C. Micro-benchmarks
We examine the effect of AL-SAFE on a single TCP or UDP
connection. For the TCP connection we created a simple TCP
client-server program to measure TCP connection times. We
examine both inbound and outbound connections. For UDP
communications we measure the time to transmit a small block
of data and receive an ECHO reply (round trip time). In both
cases the introspection period is 15 seconds. Two rules per
service are inserted in the switch-level firewall and one in the
edge firewall.
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1) Inbound TCP connection: In this scenario we install
the TCP server in the monitored guest (two rules in the
switch-level firewall are needed and only one in the edge
firewall in order to allow the communication with the server).
The results are shown in Figures 9 and 10. The case with
the smallest overhead is when the request is issued at the
end of introspection (introspection + 9 sec, thus the only
delay is due to firewall reconfiguration). As explained in
Section V-B2 the observed overhead is due to the necessary
firewall reconfiguration.
2) Outbound TCP connection: In this experiment the TCP
client is installed in the monitored guest. In contrast with an
inbound TCP connection where the connection port is known a
priori, an outbound TCP connection, shown in Figure 11, faces
the limitation of an unknown port number. Thus initiating a
request right before introspection is now the best case scenario
with the smallest overhead. In all other cases the time period
between the time of the request and the next introspection has
to be added to the connection establishment time.
3) UDP round trip time: In this micro-benchmark we
install the process receiving the ECHO request inside the
monitored guest. The results shown in Figure 12 are similar to
the case of inbound TCP connections. A detailed description of
the per-phase delays is shown in Figure 13 (two rules inserted
in the switch-level firewall and one in the edge firewall).
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D. Resource consumption
In this Section we discuss the cost of AL-SAFE in terms
of CPU consumption and RAM. We focus our analysis on
the Introspection component of our framework as it is the
one expected to consume the most resources. Since the intro-
spection mechanism extracts the necessary information about
network sockets by iterating the process list of the running
VM it is obvious that the number of processes affects both
the execution time of the VMI and the required resources. We
calculate the CPU and RAM utilisation of the introspection
process in our Web server scenario (Section V-B2), with a
generated workload of 750,000 requests from 1000 concurrent
clients, over ten executions. Since our Web server is configured
with an event-based module, it is expected to generate a lot of
child processes, each one handling a pre-specified number of
threads. We compare the result with the resources consumed
by the VMI in the Iperf scenario (Section V-B3) where only
a single process is created to handle the connection socket.
The high cost of introspection in terms of memory is because
Volatility loads the whole snapshot file (in both cases 2 GB)
into memory. Results are shown in Table I.
Table I
RESOURCE CONSUMPTION OF THE INTROSPECTION COMPONENT
Application Real (s) Usr (s) Sys (s) CPU% Memory (MB)
Apache 13.6 5.04 2.21 53.6 2193
Iperf 11.9 3.75 1.60 45 2193
E. Correctness and Security Analysis
One of the main goals of AL-SAFE is to successfully block
unauthorised connections. We have validated the correctness
of our generated rules both for inbound and outbound con-
nections. For intra-cloud connection attempts the switch-level
component of AL-SAFE successfully intercepted all packets
from processes that were not in the white list. For extra-cloud
inbound connections the packets were stopped by the edge
firewall. In both cases no unauthorised packets reached or left
the untrusted VM.
In a typical system, software exploits can directly affect the
execution of an application-level firewall. Exploits combine
network activity from a user-level component along with a
kernel-level module that hides the user-level component from
the view of the application-level firewall. The malicious exploit
likely obtains full-system privileges and can thus halt the
execution of the firewall. The malicious kernel-level module
can alter the hooks used by the in-kernel module of the
application-level firewall so that the firewall is simply never
invoked as data passes through the network. Conventional
application-level firewalls fail under these types of attacks.
AL-SAFE withstands attacks from these types of exploits.
AL-SAFE denies all unknown connections by default. In a
production system where services have sufficiently long life-
times, this tackles the case of an attacker timing the intro-
spection period and attempting to use the network between
two consecutive introspections. The performance overhead of
this choice on each connection is outlined in Section V-C.
An attacker can hijack a connection after it has been estab-
lished and verified by AL-SAFE as legitimate. He can use a
software exploit to take control of a particular process bound to
the port or use a kernel module to alter packets before they are
sent out to the local switch network interface. To counter this
issue we could place dedicated Intrusion Detection Systems
in the infrastructure, using the approach of SAIDS [2].
An attacker who fully controls the VM can also tamper
with kernel data structures to control introspection results. To
counter such attacks we could use approaches to check the
VM’s kernel integrity [18], [19].
Finally we analyze the potential vulnerabilities added by
AL-SAFE to the provider infrastructure. AL-SAFE’s compo-
nents are exposed to three kinds of potentially malicious input.
First, the white list of processes, provided by the tenant, is
expressed in a simple tabulation-separated-values text format
for which the parser is easy to make robust. Moreover, no
complex interpretation is required since the values of each
entry match fields of the firewall rules.
Second, network packets are processed by the OpenFlow
tables inserted in the local switch, and by the rules inserted
in the edge firewall. Assuming that both filtering engines are
robust, the added rules can be considered safe since the only
actions allowed are to allow or drop traffic.
Third, introspection parses kernel data structures in the VMs
in order to extract the list of active network sockets together
with their owner process name. The parsing phase relies
on commodity tools that may be vulnerable to out-of-bound
memory accesses and reference loops in the parsed structures.
Out-of-bound accesses can be avoided using languages like
Python, used by Volatility. To protect against reference loops,
as a last option a timeout could be used to stop introspecting.
The extracted information is only compared to the white list of
process names or inserted as port numbers (resp. IP addresses)
in the filtering rules. It is thus sufficient to check that extracted
values are 16 bits integers (resp. valid IP addresses).
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have designed AL-SAFE, a secure application-level
firewall that is located outside the VM but is able to retain
through virtual machine introspection the same degree of
visibility as an ”inside-the-host” solution. AL-SAFE filters
traffic at two distinct points in the virtual infrastructure and
is able to adapt the enforced ruleset based on changes in the
virtual infrastructure as well as in the list of services running
inside the monitored VMs.
We have conducted a thorough evaluation of our approach
examining both performance and correctness aspects. We
have shown that the overhead in cloud operations such as
VM migration is independent from the VM workload. This
overhead is lower than the migration time.
Our results show a dependency between the introspection
period and the generated overhead for tenant applications
running inside the untrusted VM. Increasing the introspection
period depending on the type of activity inside the VM (fewer
introspections for compute-intensive applications that do not
use the network) could significantly decrease the overhead.
In the case of servers opening new ports or applications
initiating new outgoing communications, the setup is delayed
until the next introspection cycle completes. The duration of
introspection cycles could be reduced in two ways. First,
instead of establishing a secure connection with the edge
firewall at each introspection cycle, we could use a persistent
connection. Second, instead of using Volatility to inspect
the VM’s kernel data structures, we could implement the
introspection algorithm directly in LibVMI. Indeed, Volatility
implements a very generic Python engine for describing VM
data structures, which makes introspection algorithms much
slower than C implementations in LibVMI.
AL-SAFE performs introspection periodically, which delays
the network connectivity of newly started services and clients.
To reduce this overhead, AL-SAFE could introspect on watch-
points, e.g. on listen() and connect() syscalls on TCP sockets.
In order to make AL-SAFE stateful at both levels, we are
also improving the prototype using the recently added feature
of connection tracking in Open vSwitch 2.5.
We plan to address cost minimisation by combining the
security monitoring of tenants and provider infrastructures. We
also intend to expand our architecture by including other types
of devices such as log collectors and aggregators.
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